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THE METAPHYSICS OF HERBERT SPENCER.
BY THOS, C, LAWS.
The school of thought which regarded philosophy
as implying merely the a priori study of mental phe-
nomena is now practically dead, and in its place has
arisen one which treats metaphysics but as a side
issue in speculative psychology, and psychical phe-
nomena as but a portion of those with which it is the
duty of philosophy to concern itself. It is to the in-
creasing progress of experimental science that this
change in philosophy is due, and to the new school
belongs one of the greatest masters in modern thought,
Mr. Herbert Spencer.
The matters placed under the head of metaphysics
are capable of classifications as numerous as the writ-
ers upon the subject. This is, indeed, inevitable in
so debatable a question. From first datum to final
conclusion we are in a world of controversy. How-
ever, for the sake of this essay, we may distinguish
three discussions— mind, externality, and a theory of
the universe.
The first question, then, which we ask ourselves is,
"What is Mind ? " Mr. Spencer's answer is clear and
definite. Attacking the sceptical theory of Hume, he
asks, "how can that thinker, who has decomposed
his consciousness into impressions and ideas, explain
the fact that he considers them as his impressions and
ideas? Or, once more, if, as he must, he admits that
he has an impression of his personal existence, what
warrant can he show for rejecting this impression as
unreal, and accepting his other impressions as real ?
Unless he can give satisfactory answers. to these que-
ries, which he cannot, he must abandon his conclu-
sions, and must admit the reality of the individual
mind."i Elsewhere, he speaks of mind as "the un-
derlying something " of which distinguishable portions
or mental phenomena are formed, or of which they
are modifications.- To this it may be replied that, as
Mr. Spencer himself admits, of this ultimate mind we
have no knowledge whatever. We are acquainted
with mental phenomena, we can study them, analyse
them, recombine them, but throughout all these pro-
cesses we come across no evidence of an underlying
1 First Principles, g 20.
2 Principles 0/ Psychology, § 58.
something. Here is a society—a public company,
say, or a nation. Corporations, as Sir Edward Coke
said, have no souls to save. Take away all the units
forming that society, and what is left ? Is there an
"underlying something"? And yet every individual
is conscious that the society of which he is part exists
;
every society is capable of acting as one and united.
The English nation has a tangible existence, and will
have, so long as Englishmen exist, but if we scatter
all Englishmen to the winds, no English nation will
remain. So with mind : an individual mind exists so
long as there exist those "impressions and ideas" (to
use Hume's phraseology), which constitute it. But,
it may be argued, these impressions and ideas are con-
stantly changed. The same is true of the particles
which form the substance of the body, yet we regard it,
from the cradle to the tomb, as one individual body.
The English nation has existed as such since the days
of Egfrid and Ini, or at least since the final union of
the Saxon peoples was made by Egbert in the ninth
century. During those centuries, however, every unit
has changed innumerable times, and the composition
and condition of the nation undergone a complete
transformation. So the individual mind remains in-
tact, notwithstanding the manifold changes which take
place in its component "impressions and ideas." How,
Mr. Spencer asks, do we recognise these impressions
as ours ? What warrant have we for regarding them
as real, while we set aside an " underlying something "
as unreal? How do we recognise the consciousness,
continuity, or personality, which constitutes a mental
being ?
During the course of evolution, ancestral, prenatal,
and personal, there has been evolved a sense of dis-
crimination between subjective and objective exist-
ence, whereb)' we have come to regard all impressions
affecting our physical organisation as ours. Tlie ques-
tion of personality is bound up with that of the rela-
tion between consciousness and body. No writer has
done more than Mr. Spencer to prove to us that con-
sciousness is as much a function of the body as respi-
ration or digestion, or any physical process whatso-
ever. Not only is greater complexity of mentality
associated with greater complexity of cerebral and
nervous stucture and organisation, but during the pro-
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cess of ideation, chemical and physical action goes on
in the substance of the brain. Vigorous mental action
leaves the body as fatigued as vigorous physical exer-
tion ; during its process certain alkaline phosphates
are largely produced and afterwards eliminated from
the system ; a greater rush of blood takes place to the
brain, resulting, when the pressure has been consider-
able or prolonged, in those disorders frequent in men
and women of extraordinary mental powers and activ-
ity, such as vertigo and partial congestion of the cere-
bral blood-vessels. Accidents to the body often impair
consciousness, sometimes only temporarily, but fre-
quently inflicting permanent injury to the thinking
faculties. Similarly, we have the connexion between
delirium and bodily fevers set up by local irritations
or loss of blood ; insensibility, caused by a blow ; loss
of speech (aphasia), due to disease of a nerve in the
head ; loss of memory, illusions, insanity, and other
morbid conditions of the mind, caused by disease and
physical injuries. We may note, too, mental and
moral diseases arising from congenital causes—mur-
der, kleptomania, dipsomania, and epilepsy—and opin-
ions caused and modified by climate, temper, health,
and social surroundings. Finally, we may remark the
gradual development of mind as the child grows, its
maturity in middle age, and in general its decline as
physical energies decline, sometimes merging into
dotage and senile imbecility, until dissolution of the
body brings the mental functions to a close. But un-
derlying all these special facts is the general one that
the ultimate source of ideas is experience, and that we
can have no experience save through the organs of
sense and their adjuncts, the nerves. From which
two conclusions are irresistible. First, that psychology
is not in itself a general concrete science, but merely
a special branch of one,—biology, the science of life
in all its forms. The second and more important con-
clusion is that no "underlying something," no inde-
pendent mind, exists, but that the sensoriiim (to use an
expression of George Henry Lewes's), of which con-
sciousness is a function, is coextensive with the entire
body, from cerebrum to the tiniest and most distant
nerve-filament. Hence it is that we regard "impres-
sions and ideas" experienced by us as ours, because
they are part and parcel of our physical organisation,
just as are digestion and the circulation of the blood.
No man suffering from dyspepsia, even though he be
the most extreme idealist, ever doubts that it is Ins
stomach which is deranged. Equally, no man ex-
periencing a certain sensation, receiving a certain im-
pression, cognising a certain idea, doubts for one
moment that the sensation, impression, and idea are
Ills.
It is here that the modern critical psychology parts
company entirely with that of Hume, and with its
physical basis runs little or no risk of merging into
idealism, as did his.
The theory here advanced is, nevertheless, simply
an extension of that of Berkeley, who disputed the
existence of any "material substratum" or "matter"
behind the phenomena which are observable, declar-
ing of these phenomena that "their esse \% percipi, nor
is it possible that they should have any existence out
of the minds or thinking things which perceive them,"'
stripped of what is unphilosophical therein and brought
up to the discoveries of modern psychology.
What is the bearing of this theory upon the ques-
tion of externality? "I do not argue," says Berkeley,
"against the existence of any one thing that we can
apprehend, either by sense or reflexion. That the
things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands
do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.
The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which
philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And
in doing this no harm is done to the rest of mankind,
who, I dare say, will never miss it ... . while philos-
ophers may possibly find that they have lost a great
handle for trifling and disputation. "^ And elsewhere
he remarks with truth, that "if we thoroughly exam-
ine this tenet" of a material substratum, we shall find
it "at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract
ideas. "3 Abstraction is one of the most complex of
logical processes, consisting in the creation out of
particular facts of general or abstract ideas, which
shall include all those characters wherein these facts
agree, while neglecting all those wherein they differ.
Man is an abstract idea ; so, too, are color, the press,
and religion. For there exists in nature no abstract
man : we are acquainted only with concrete, individual
men. We know colors, such as red and green, but
create color in the abstract ; we acquaint ourselves
with newspapers and their staffs ; there exists a variety
of religions, of religious doctrines and ceremonials,
and of religious men and women, but no religion apart
from these. The same is true of the sciences, so that
the so-called controversy between science and religion
is meaningless, except as an expression of conflict be-
tween certain scientific facts and certain theological
dogmas, or between the opinions of scientific obser-
vers and those of theologians. In the same manner,
the idea of externality is an abstraction : we are con-
versant with a multitude of phenomena in so far as
they impress themselves upon our senses, wherefrom
we infer an existence external to ourselves. We may
justify realism by many arguments, the setting forth
of which occupies a considerable portion of Mr. Spen-
cer's " Principles of Psychology." Let it here suffice
1 Berkeley, rrhlciplcs 0/Human K>iowle,/ge. §3.
!«'V.,§35.
1 /I'id
, § 5.
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to remark that even the idealist philosopher himself
habitually thinks, feels, speaks, and acts as though an
external world exists ; that our organisation, indeed,
is such that we cannot but imply its existence in ever}'
act of life ; and that the minutest examination proves
only what a cursory one makes us aware of, that there
exist facts over which we have some sort of control, and
which are evidently ours, and that there exist others over
which we have no control whatever, and which are evi-
dently of an origin beyond our consciousness. ' But an
idea, as Berkeley says, "can be like nothing but an
idea";^ a suggestion which Mr. Spencer has worked up
into his theory of Transfigured Realism. ^ There exist
an internal world and an external world acting constantly
upon one another, and, although the impressions con-
veyed to our minds of the external world of fact,
through the internal world of sense, cannot be proved
to be identical with the facts of that external world,
yet they have acquired, through the evolution of sen-
sibility, a relation to those facts which is constant and
reliable. We may call it conventionality or habit, if
we will, still the relation cannot be denied. It is here
that Mr. Spencer's philosophy is immeasurably supe-
rior to that of Berkeley, who appears to drift from a
critical statement of psychological fact into a visionary
idealism which denies the existence of everything out-
side the perceiving mind, and which, as Hume said of
it later, admitted of no answer, but produced no con-
viction.
But, if Mr. Spencer be thus scientifically right in
his theory of externality, he is, perhaps, unscientifi-
cally wrong in that of the unknowable. Nor is he al-
ways consistent in his use of that term. In the first
part of " First Principles," the unknowable would ap
pear to be simply that which could never come within
human ken. But later he narrows his use of the term,
until finally we are told by a writer who speaks of the
idea of a first cause as unthinkable, to regard this un-
knowable in terms of the persistence of force as an
"absolute force of which we are indefinitely conscious,"
a "cause which transcends our knowledge and con-
ception," and an "unconditioned reality, without be-
ginning or end."-*
Mr. Spencer's argument may be briefly put. Locke
urged, in his celebrated Essay, the existence of im-
passable barriers against human knowledge, trusting
that when we had learned "how far the understand-
ing can extend its view, how far it has faculties to at-
tain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and
1 This last was admitted by Berkeley, who distinguished between the
ideas of sense and those of hiui^itation, declaring the former to have a " stead-
iness, order, and coherence," which is wanting in the latter, and to be ideas
"excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit." [See Priticifles,
§§28-33.)
and., §8.
y Spencer, Principles 0/ Psychology, gS 471-474.
i First Principles, § 62.
guess," such knowledge would be "of use to prevail
with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in
meddling with things exceeding its comprehension ; to
stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether ; and
to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things, which,
upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach
of our capacities," for "men may find matter sufficient
to busy their hands with variety, delight, and satis-
faction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own
constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands
are filled with, because they are not big enough to
grasp everything." i Criticising the various theories
which have been put forward regarding the origin and
constitution of the universe, Mr. Spencer finds one and
all to be inconsistent, and contradictory, and incapable
of standing the strain of criticism, and concludes that
in our researches into them we are but buffeted be-
tween opposite absurdities. He finds that ultimately
matter and force, space and time are in themselves
alike inscrutable, and that we can only know their
phenomena. Had he stopped there and maintained
that these phenomena alone have an objective exist-
ence, and that matter, force, space, and time are ab-
stract ideas, having no existence outside the human
mind, we should not here have found it necessary to
criticise him. But, instead, he maintains their objec-
tive reality, and asserts that they are modes of mani-
festation of an unknowable existence. The fallacy of
the theory lies in its assumption of the objectivity of
knowledge. Knowledge is a sum-total of experiences,
received through the senses, and, as such, can have
only subjective existence. In other words, there may
be external facts, but knowledge of them can only be
within the thinking mind. Hence knowable and un-
knowable are no more entities than are those human
creations, the "laws of nature." There are, so far as
we are aware, no laws in nature—there exist phenom-
ena, whose observed order and sequence is, for con-
venience sake, framed into an abstract or general
law, by which new facts are observed, tested, or ex-
plained. To the savage, the researches of our labora-
tories and our observatories are unknowable : his mind
is so constituted that he could not comprehend them,
if explained to him. Looking at the universe in its
relation to human consciousness, we may distinguish
the known from the unknown, seeking ever to widen
the domain of the former at the expense of the latter.
As we have already said, what Kant calls the "pure
forms of sensibility, elements of knowledge a priori," -'
and what Mr. Spencer speaks of as "ultimate scien-
tific ideas," have no existence outside the human mind.
We distinguish facts into material or dynamic, tem-
poral or spatial, according to their prevailing charac-
1 Locke, Essay on the Hutnan Understanding, g§ 4,
2 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernun/t, (Leipsic, Reclam,) p. 50.
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ters. But matter in itself, inert and apart from its
phenomena, is a logical impossibility. It must exist
in time and space ; if in motion, must be impelled by
one force ; if immobile, must be kept rigidly in posi-
tion by another. Space and time, without something
to exist therein, and force, without something to act
upon, are alike contradictions in terms. In nature
there exists no pure matter, no pure force, no abstract
time and space ; these are general notions framed by
man to synthesise his conception of the universe in
which he lives. And so long as he bears in mind that
they are but ideas of his and uses them as such for
observation and research, all will be well. The evil
arises, when, mistaking his words for realities, he dog-
matises upon them, builds up systems of speculation
upon them, and raises aloft metaphysical and theologi-
cal structures, which, when the winds of criticism do
howl and the billows of logic do break themselves
thereupon, shall fall with mighty crash, for they were
builded upon the sands of obscurantism and ambiguity.
"Words," let us say with Hobbes, "are wise men's
counters, they do but reckon by them ; but they are
the money of fools, that value them by the authority
of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other
doctor whatever, if but a man."i The fundamental
necessity to all philosophic discussion is definition. If
we desire to be of those who speak " with many words
making nothing understood," we shall throw definition
to the dogs and exactity to the winds, using our words
with little respect to meaning. But he who desires to
make others profit by that which he tells, must first
learn so to train his language that it represents all his
thoughts without doubt or ambiguity, nor leaves ready
room for sophistry. Knowledge is power, but unless
in the exercise of that power one learns adequately to
define one's words, to maintain those definitions when
made, and to swerve therefrom neither to the right
hand nor to the left, one shall find one's knowledge a
power not for good but for evil.
BERKELEY'S POSITIVISM.
Bishop Berkeley is frequently misunderstood not
only by the unphilosophical public, but also by phi-
losophers, and among the latter must be reckoned his
own disciples and followers, not less than his adversa-
ries. This great Irish philosopher was much more
radical than could be expected of a bishop, and he is
much more in accord with positivism than would be
generally conceded to a thorough idealist who denies
the existence of any material substratum called matter.
Indeed we should say that apart from a difference of
terminology and of our methods of attacking the vari-
ous problems—our own view of monistic positivism is
in close agreement with Berkeley's idealism. We do
1 Hobbes, Leviathan, c. iv.
not intend here to expound Berkeley's philosophy or
enter into a critical examination of it, but shall confine
ourselves to one point only, concerning which Mr.
Thomas C. Laws, in his article on "The Metaphysics
of Herbert Spencer, says :
"It is here that Mr. Spencer's philosophy is immeasurably
superior to that of Berkeley, who appears to drift from a critical
statement of psychological fact into a visionary idealism which
denied the existence of everything outside the perceiving mind."
There are quite a number of prominent authors
like the French materialist Baron D'Holbach and the
English poet Lord Byron, who publicly confessed that
they could not refute Berkeley, however unthinkable
his idealism appeared to them. There must be some
powerful truth in a statement which cannot be refuted.
Is Berkeley's system perhaps a consistent description
of the world in terms commonly used in a different
sense ? This may be one reason, but there is another
and weightier one which makes his views unacceptable
even to those who cannot answer his arguments ; it is
the fact that he skilfully trips the unconscious meta-
physicism of materialism as well as spiritualism ; and
materialism is a lingering chain, which among many
professed, dualists and monists is still the most deeply
seated preconception of our time.
Concerning the passage quoted from Mr. Laws, we
believe that Berkeley's view is not correctly repre-
sented. Berkeley denies the existence of a hypostati-
sation like matter, but he does not deny the existence
of everything outside the perceiving mind. Does not
Berkeley speak of God as that something (Berkeley
awkwardly calls it "spirit") which excites our sense-
impressions? What Berkeley calls God, we call real-
ity, and in so far as in reality the All of facts in their
oneness are the ultimate authority of moral conduct, we
should make no objection to the Bishop's terminology.
Berkeley does not deny the reality of things. Here he
differs from many of his misguided disciples and fol-
lowers, who imagine they become deep philosophers
by denying the reality of things. Berkeley is as much
a realist as any unsophisticated farm-laborer can be,
who, working with a shovel, trusts that the soil he
digs is an actuality and no mere illusion. Berkeley
(as quoted by Mr. Laws) says: "That the things
I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do
exist, really exist, I make not the least question."
What, then, does Berkeley deny, to deserve the name
idealist? Berkeley denies the existence of a meta-
physical substratum called matter ; he denies what
.
Professor Huxley and other modern physiologists call
the physical basis of mind ; he denies that matter
alone is real, and that mind is only a property of mat-
ter ; in other words, he denies the metaphysical ex-
istence of matter and regards matter as a mere ab-
stract term.
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Mr. Laws regards psychology as a special branch
of biology and says of " modern critical psychology "
that it
"'^ith its physical basis runs little or no risk of merging into
idealism."
The mere term "physical basis of mind " implies a
metaphysical assumption ; it implies the theory, of
late so lucidly set forth by Mr. Lester F. Ward in the
January number of The Monist, that matter is real,
while mind is merely a property of matter, a view
which we reject as a pseudo-monism, because it uni-
fies the universe by means of a one-sided system ; it
is a single-concept theory, not a truly unitary system
;
It is henism, not monism.'
If we compare the formal categories of our mind
to a system of drawers or pigeon-holes in which all
our experiences are classified and stored away in good
order, so as to be handy when wanted, the henist feel-
ing the necessity of bringing unity into his thought-
material, is like a man who puts all into one great box.
The spiritualist subsumes everything under spirit, as
either spirit itself, or a property of spirit ; the materi-
alist subsumes everything under matter, as either
matter itself, or a property of matter ; the dynamist
or mechanicalist subsumes everything under energy
as a mode of motion or the effect of a motion. True
monism must always remain conscious of the method
by which we have constructed our abstract notions
;
it must not forget that they are thought-symbols to
which some features of reality correspond, but that
neither matter, nor spirit, nor energy represent inde-
pendent entities or things in themselves which can be
assumed to be the substratum of reality and the meta-
physical basis of our experience.
We do not deny that it is sometimes convenient in
special branches of science to regard matter as thing,
and color as a quality of matter. But in doing so, we
must remain conscious of the poetical licence which
we indulge in. This method of viewing things serves
a temporary purpose and must be dropped with the
special occasion. If we retain the fiction of matter
being the true reality and not merely an abstract repre-
senting a quality or a number of qualities abstracted
from our experiences, we shall soon become puzzled
with the children of our own thought, and, like Mr.
Spencer, become victims of agnosticism, standing
overawed with wonder before the simplest generalisa-
tions, as if they contained the mysteries of being in a
concentrated form. We need not repeat here how
Spencer, in his "First Principles," obscures all issues
so as to render the ideas matter, motion, and mind
1 See The Monist, Vol. IV, No. 2, "A Monistic Theory of Mind," by Lester
F. Ward, and the editorial, " Monism and Henism." Compare also Prof. C.
Lloyd Morgan's article in the present number of Ths Monist (Vol. IV, No. 3),
pp. 321-332, " Three Aspects of Monism."
self-contradictory and incomprehensible, thus produc-
ing mysteries where there are none.' Suffice it to
say that any one who either unconsciously or con-
sciously hypostatises his abstract notions will sooner or
later arrive at mj'sticism or agnosticism, that is to say,
he will sooner or later be so bewildered with the con-
fusion of his own thought as to declare: "Philosophy
is too much for me, I do not understand its problems,
and as I cannot solve them, no one can."
Mr. Laws, we are glad to notice, not only rejects
Mr. Spencer's notion of the unknowable, but also ac-
cepts the theory of abstraction. He says :
"Abstraction is one of the most complex of logical processes,
consisting in the creation out of particular facts of general or ab-
stract ideas, which shall include all those characters wherein these
facts agree, while neglecting all those wherein they differ. Man
is an abstract idea; so, too, are color, the press, and religion."
But accepting this theory of abstraction, is it not
inconsistent to speak of consciousness as a function of
the body, and mind as a product of the brain ; to re-
gard impressions and ideas as part and parcel of our
physical (!) organisation? We do not deny, as we said
above, that occasions may arise in which it might be
convenient to speak of matter and its properties, or
even to represent the atoms of the brain as the true
reality and our thoughts as mere functions of the brain.
But this view is unphilosophical. Such a licence is
temporarily allowable when we compare two qualities
of which the one is relatively stable the other relatively
transient. For instance, weight and color. In the
case of mind and brain, however, this mode of speech
is not admissible, except when we take a purely physi-
ological aspect and inquire into the brain mechanism
of thought, excluding feelings, ideas, and the mean-
ings of ideas. By mind, however, we understand the
interaction of ideas and the meaning of ideas. When
speaking of ideas, we should not forget that thinking
is a mental process, which, if it were visible in a trans-
parent brain, would appear to an outside observer as
a brain- motion. But the relatively constant factor in
thinking is the idea thought and not the material atoms
of the brain which vibrate while we think. The idea
remains the same, while the brain-substance is con-
stantly renewed ; our conceptions remain constant in
the flux of physiological changes of matter. Thus, as
soon as we discuss psychological problems we should
rather be justified in regarding mind as the realitj' and
brain action as one of its qualities, than the reverse.
We do not say that psychologists must present men-
tal problems in this form, but they can provisionally
assume this view as much as a physicist may speak of
bodies and their properties.
In case psychologists adopt the henism of regard-
ing matter as the real thing and mind as a property
1 See The Open Court, No. 212.
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only of the brain-cells, they commit themselves to the
absurdity of regarding the secretions of the nervous
substance which after having done the thinking are
thrown out in the natural way, as man's true self. In
thus identifying ourselves with the material that passes
through our body, we become blind to the spiritual
nature of our being and we shall look upon death as a
finality. When an idea has been thought, the particles
that did the thinking will soon be replaced by other
substance, and after a brief time be wiped out of the
brain, yet the idea will remain in our mind. In the
same way, when we die our remains will be buried, but
not we, not our souls, not our true selves, which are
of a spiritual nature. Our souls can be preserved. Our
ideas can be thought again, and our aspirations can
continue. The temple in which they are enshrined
will be broken, but the temple will be built up again,
and our spiritual being will be resurrected to new life.
True monism rejects all hypostatisation, material-
istic, spiritualistic, or mechanistic. By bearing in
mind that abstract notions are part-representations of
reality, describing sections, features or qualities of
existence, we do not fall a prey to self-mystification,
and see our way clearly before us. We may differ as
to the propriety of terms and their definitions, such
as Reason, God, Religion, and others, but we have
definite issues and practical problems. The road of
scientific and philosophical investigation is no longer
blocked by insolvable mysteries, unknowables or other
metaphysical hobgoblins. We begin with the facts
given in experience and are no longer in need of as-
sumptions, axioms, or hypothetical principles as build-
ing material for our world-conception. Thus philoso-
phy has become a science, the statements of which are
no longer a matter of partisan position or dependent
upon postulates; they can be decided by investigation
and subjected to the test of being in agreement or dis-
agreement with facts. p. C.
THE NEW ERA.
BY ATHERTON BLIGHT.
A BOOK of unusual interest and importance in the line of re-
ligious thought has appeared recently. I refer to Prof. Edward
Caird's Gifford lectures, " The Evolution of Religion." The dis-
tinguished author and thinker has only recently succeeded the
great Greek scholar, the late Professor Jowett, as Master of Bal-
liol. How well I remember hailing with delight the publication
of " Essays and Reviews," in i860, and how those of us interested
in such subjects were encouraged by the now famous dictum of
Jowett, " Interpret the Bible as you would any other book." And
now, after a generation of men have left the stage and we are
nearing the close of the nineteenth century, the new Master of
Balliol declares that what Christ conceived by a divine intuition,
what his followers and the Church partly developed, partly mis-
understood, this is now the proper object of a religious philosophy.
In an interesting notice of this valuable work in the Ni-w York
F.vening Post, the author says ; ' ' The result of Professor Caird's
thought is thus a revised Christianity, from which the traditional
sort of supernaturalism has indeed been banished. The highly
unconventional character of the theology thus outlined is obvious.
The Gospel history is in consequence interpreted without recourse
to miracle. The greater part of traditional Church dogma appears
as non-essential opinion having only historical interest. Human
immortality is apparently, in Professor Caird's mind, at present a
problem whose philosophical answer is decidedly incomplete, if
not altogether problematic."
The point, then, which I wish to make clear is that Professor
Caird, like Dr. Momerie and other profound thinkers, have, with
'file Open Coiirl, utterly abandoned the supernaturalism of the
churches. Even the Bishop of London in a recent address on
" Faith " said that our faith could not rest entirely on externals,
including miracles, but we must largely rely upon the faith of the
soul in the eternal supremacy of holiness, justice, and goodness.
He said, and they are very remarkable words proceeding from
such a source, " that the recognition of God is in reality the recog-
nition of the moral law in action." Is not this the very essence of
the teaching of TJie Open Court ?
I would like to call your attention to another book, not so
weighty and philosophical as the two volumes of Professor Caird,
but nevertheless a very interesting and suggestive little work, and
one which should be read carefully by every one interested in the
great cause Tlie Open Court has at heart. I have reference to
"The Religion of a Literary Man," by Richard Le Gallienne.
Allow me to give you two quotations, which fairly give the key-
note of the little book : "The most vital point at which religious
controversy formerly ever arrived was the inspiration of the Bible.
But that difficulty has passed ; we now either accept or reject the
inspiration of a hundred Bibles, and the question is no longer of
the inspiration of one book, but of the inspiration of the human
soul, which has dictated all books."
This is my second quotation : " To speak of natural religious
senses will seem redundant to any one familiarised with the ob-
vious idea that everything that exists, religion included, is ' nat-
ural,' that
" ' Nature is made better by no mean,
But Nature makes that mean : over that art
Which you say adds to Nature, is an art
That Nature makes.'
" But one has been so brought up to regard religion as some-
thing superimposed upon our human nature, rather than as some-
thing blossoming out of it, that the habit clings."
Professor Dowden in his "Studies in Literature," published,
I think, in the seventies, assumes that such views as M. Le Gal-
lienne's prevail generally among educated people ; and Mr. Sted-
man in his charming books, the ' ' Victorian Poets " and " Poets of
America," seems to take very much the same position. But in
Mr. Stedman's important work on " The Nature and Elements of
Poetry " he says in a very just and beautiful eulogy of the " Book
of Common Prayer ": " The sincere agnostic must be content with
his not inglorious isolation ; he must barter the rapture and beauty
and hope of such a liturgy for his faith in something different,
something compensatory, perchance a future and still more world-
wide brotherhood of men."
Did Mr. Stedman never read Mr. Frederick Harrison's "Apol-
ogy for His Faith " in the Fortnightly Review ? Therein that most
interesting essayist shows that the advanced thinker always keeps
touch with the past. The greater includes the less. We have not
bartered the rapture and beauty and hope of the liturgy. What-
ever is divine in it, or, in Goethe's phrase, ministers to our highest
development, we retain as a possession forever. The scholar with
Emerson "sails with God the seas, " and you cannot bring him
too good news from any quarter. To return again to Professor
Caird "the idea of development teaches us to distinguish the one
spiritual principle which is continually working in man's life, from
THE OPEN COURT. 4045
the changing forms through which it passes in the course of its
history; .... to do justice to the past without enslaving the pres.
ent, and to give freedom to the thought of the present without for-
getting that it in its turn must be criticised and transcended by
the widening consciousness of the future."
By far the most trenchant criticism of the kind we have been
considering is that of Mr. Leslie Stephen in his "Agnostic's Apol-
ogy and Other Essays." In the course of one of his chapters he
remarks that we cannot change our opinions as we would take
jewels out of a box and replace them with others. Change o'-
view— of belief is 2u growth, s. process of the mind. Edmund Scherer
the distinguished French essayist, said it took him fifteen years of
study and reflexion before he became completely emancipated
from the old clerical method of assuming a supernatural and then
proceeding to build an elaborate theology. We must have a reason
for the faith that is in us. It is easy now, as Renan says, to pro-
claim with the gamin in the street that Christ never rose from the
dead ; but to show the steps of reasoning whereby one arrives at
that conclusion is a very different thing. We see now very clearly
that the Bible is a purely liuman production and being written aj
the time it was, in a perfectly uncritical age and in an oriental
country, it must perforce of circumstances have contained all kinds
of marvellous stories, the bodily resurrection of Jesus among the
rest. Goethe said there is nothing worth thinking but it has been
thought before ; 'oe must only try to think it again. ' ' What Goethe
means, " says Mr. Bailey Saunders in his interesting ' ' Maxims and
Reflexions of Goethe, " "is that we shall do best to find out the
truth of all things for ourselves, for on one side truth is individ-
ual ; and that we shall be happy if our icdividual truth is also
universal, or accords with the wisest thought of the past."
" The spring of a new era is in the air—an era of faith," ex-
claims M. Le Gallienne, a great deal of the old faith of the "ages
of faith, "at least in the formulas, symbols, and expressions now
long outworn, is, as Renan shows, impossible to the modern crit-
ical, emancipated mind. M. Le Gallienne and many others are
almost daily giving us valuable bints for the faith of the future.
• Oh! bells of San Bias, in vain
Ye call back the past again.
The past is deaf to your prayer-
Out of the shadows of night
The world rolls into light,
'Tis daybreak everywhere."
CURRENT TOPICS.
The Chicago election is over, and it is gratifying to read in
the morning papers that it ' ' passed off quietly. " There were only
about a hundred fights, all told, with a proper proportion of broken
heads to each. A goodly number of shots were fired, but as the
gunners were full of beer the bullets went wild. Only two or
three men were shot, and even these are "expected to recover."
In the First Ward it was bullets against ballots, and the bullets
won. Much patriotic feeling was exhibited in this ward among
the partisans of Mr. Coughlin and Mr. Skakel, the opposing can-
didates for the cffice of alderman, and they turned the election
into a Donnybrook Fair. When the polls closed it was found that
Mr. Coughlin was elected, and that Mr. Skakel's men were most
of them in the hospital, or at their various places of residence un-
der the doctor's care. A large number of colored men live in the
First Ward, and they showed as much aptitude for American citi-
zenship as the white men. Two of them, " Slicky Sam " Phillips
and "Toots" Marshal! fought a duel m the crowded thoroughfare
at the corner of Taylor and State Streets, but, unfortunately, al-
though they "emptied their revolvers," only one of them was
wounded, and this was explained as due more to accident than
aim, because his feet were "unusually large, " and one of them
stopped a bullet. One of Mr. Skakel's band-wagons was filled
with hireling musicians, playing "Marching through Georgia,
"
and they had the temerity to blow their bugles in front of "Hinky
Dink's" saloon, the headquarters of the Coughlin party. As might
have been expected, they were welcomed with a volley from the
revolvers of the Coughlin men. The musicians ' ' ducked, " and the
bullets passing o\er them went into McCoy's Hotel, but merely
breaking the windows and the plaster on the inside walls. No
blame attaches to the Coughlin men for this, because it is con-
ceded by public sentiment that the quality of the music justified
the shooting. This election was merely for aldermen and town-
ship officers
; it did not include within its fortunes the glory and
emoluments of national, state, or county candidates, and that's
the reason it "passed off quietly."
Anxious to see how the civil war in South Carolina was get-
ting along, I glanced over the dispatches from Columbia dated
April 3, and I found at the beginning of them these rather startling
headlines: "Tillman makes an incendiary speech at Columbia."
Knowing that the person spoken of as "Tillman" was the Gov-
ernor of South Carolina, I wondered how a magistrate of such
high rank and royalty could make an incendiary speech, for I had
supposed that only swarthy laborers, rude rebellious men of low
degree, or " pale-browed enthusiasts," impatient of social wrongs,
could commit such a crime as that. Surely the order and arrange-
ment of affairs in this conservative world must be turning upside
down when governors compete with labor agitators in the business
of setting politics on fire by means of incendiary speeches. Sedi-
tion may become fashionable yet, although there is none of it in
the oratory of Governor Tillman, so far as I can see. Incendiary
speeches are usually directed against the law, but those of Gov-
ernor Tillman are passionate appeals in favor of the law, and they
express a determination to suppress the revolutionary factions and
the mutinous militia that seek to overthrow the law. The revolt
of the militia is ominous, because it throws another element of
uncertainty into the social problem, for if the militia is not to be
relied on, what is the use of our armories and our Gatling guns '
* * *
Whatever we may think about the laws of South Carolina, or
the policy of Governor Tillman, we must admit that he is neither
a time-server nor a coward. There is manly stuff in this governor,
and a good supply of that civic nerve that all magistrates ought to
have. "I have sworn to enforce the laws," he said ; "the dis-
pensary law is on the statute books, and I will exert all the powers
of my office to see that the law is obeyed." We have so many in-
vertebrate politicians in power now, supple statesmen who, undu-
lating gracefully as worms, can wriggle up and down through all
the rounds of a ladder, that a chief magistrate, who in the midst
of mutiny and civil turmoil, with assassination promised him, can
stand erect on his feet without breaking, looks like one of the old
heroic statues of the Greeks. The very sight of these in their
majestic strength and symmetry makes all of us a little stronger
than we might otherwise be. Goiernor Tillman makes no pre-
tensions to orate ry or scholarship, and perhaps the critics may be
able to show some rhetorical mistakes in the poise and balance of
his words, but there are parts of the speech he made at Columbia
on Monday that remind us of the oration of Cicero when he told
the Senate of the plot that had been formed for his assassination
Referring to a similar plot against himself. Governor Tillman
said : "One man told Mr. Yelldell here that he came from Edge-
field, my own county, with a shotgun to kill me Friday night. My
life is not worth much to me, but it is worth as much to me as the
life of any other man is to him, but rather than desert my pos',
where you have placed me, I would have stood there until I fdl
dead. The men who are threatening to fire this powder magazine
are the bar-room element, and those who are urging them on are
the rulers of the old oligarchy. This riot is a political frenzy; I
shall not swerve an inch from the stand that I have taken as the
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people's governor. You may imagine from this that I am going
to aggravate the trouble, but I am simply going to uphold the
law." This rebuke to the antediluvian aristocracy, this defiance
o£ the conspirators, this elevation of duty above life itself, all in-
tensified by a renewal of his oath to enforce the law, give to the
speech of Governor Tillman a spirit and dignity not surpassed in
the famous oration against Catiline.
A very fine distinction, one of the finest in the moral code,
was drawn the other day by the striking workmen who had been
employed at Crane's factory in Chicago. They were holding a
meeting at Bricklayers' Hall, when a donation amounting to twenty
dollars was received from Mr- Jacob Horn, the candidate for West
town assessor, and a discussion immediately arose as to the pro-
priety of accepting money from a candidate. According to the re-
port in the paper, as to the truth of which, however, I am rather
sceptical, it was decided to return the money. At the same meet-
ing, a letter was read from A. F. Hoffman, the Democratic candi-
date for West Town collector, in which he " donated" twenty kegs
of beer to be used at the ball which the strikers will give at the
Second Regiment Armory. The beer was accepted with entbusi-
asiic cheers. The moral difference between a gift of money and
a gift of beer as a bid for votes is finer than a spider's thread, and
yet there are consciences that can walk securely on that flimsy
string. Old Stillman Strong of Marbletown used to say when
tempted at election time, " A soul I have above lucre, money can-
not buy me, but whiskey can." There are many men who have
moral constitutions just like that of Stillman Strong. When Gen.
Albert Sidney Johnstone was about starting in command of the
Utah expedition, an officer came to him and asked permission to
take a box of books, but the General answered, "No, there are
not wagons enough to carry the baggage absolutely necessary for
the expedition." Then the officer asked if he might carry a barrel
of whiskey afong, and the General replied, "Certainly! Certainly!
Anything in reason !"
Two or three weeks ago, I predicted that the army of General
Coxey would straggle out of existence without ever coming within
sight of Pittsburg. I was wrong ; and hereafter I shall prophesy
after the fact, for in spite of some desertions, the army increased
a little every day, and it marched into Pittsburg nearly three hun-
dred strong. Not only that, but it was at Pittsburg and Alleghany
that the army became of any serious interest or importance, and
this through the illegal and arbitrary measures adopted by the
police. Before the police powers interfered with Coxey 's men in
a harsh despotic way, the army was merely amusing, a grotesque
imitation of the tatterdemallion company recruited by Sir John
Falstaff ; but after that interference, it represented liberty, and it
commanded sympathy. The imprisonment of the army in the
corral at Alleghany with a police deadline drawn around it, was
an assault upon the freedom of American citizens to travel from
one part of the country to another either on foot or on the excur-
sion train. The arrest, imprisonment, and punishment by fine of
citizens guilty of no crime was an unwarranted act of persecution
done by the magistrates and police in anarchistic defiance of the
Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of Penn-
sylvania. It was drawing another deadline between the classes
and the masses, between the rich and the poor ; and it was gather-
ing up wraih for the day of wrath. It was altogether gratuitous
and unnecessary, a wanton exercise of bludgeon power, adding
another contribution to that threatening mass of discontent which
is already too large for the peace and safety of the republic. It
gave dramatic dignity to a spectacle which previously was nothing
but burlesque.
M. M. Trumbull.
NOTES.
Dr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones takes issue with Dr. Harper for mak-
ing a distinction between the office of the preacher and the teacher.
Dr. Harper, who has given offence to his Baptist brethren for
presenting in his lectures some of the results of modern Bible
criticism says : " If I were a preacher and were preaching about
these stories I would minimise the human element and magnify
the divine element, but as a teacher I must present both sides. I
am presenting facts." Dr. Jones understands Dr. Harper to say
that "the preacher's vocation is less than that of a truth teller,"
and that it is his business (in the words of Jeremiah) to "bend his
tongue as if it were a bow for falsehood. " He takes the proposition
of "minimising" and "magnifying" in the sense of disfiguring
or misrepresenting. And truly Dr. Jones is right in holding that
any falsehood is to be denounced, be it in the preacher or in the
teacher. All that Dr. Jones says in condemnation of equivocalness
is true, and we agree with him that the preacher's first allegiance
not less than the teacher's is to truth, and all other considerations of
tact, propriety, regard for the sentiments of others and so forth, are
to be subordinated to this supreme law of moral conduct. But we
must add. Is it fair to understand Professor Harper to mean that
he expects the preacher to hide the truth ? Is it charitable to put
this interpretation upon his utterance ? We have not seen the
quoted sentence in its context, but are confident that Dr. Harper
uses the word " magnify " in the sense of " emphasise." It is not
the office of the clergyman to preach on Biblical criticism ; the
office of the clergyman is to preach morality. By God we under-
stand the authority of moral conduct, and " divine " is according to
common usage all that is elevating and sanctifying. In this sense
President Harper is right when he says that the preacher must
make great the divine, while a teacher has simply to lay down
facts. The preacher's duty is higher ; he has to teach the truth
and utilise it for practical life. The facts which he presents must
serve a purpose and to present facts which have no bearing upon
practical morality is out of place in the pulpit. We expect that
President Harper is still attached to the old dogmatism of his
church and has probably other conceptions than we of what God
and Divine are ; but that need not concern us here. The main
thing is that it is not probable, nay, impossible, that he meant what
he is criticised for.
A note of correction seems necessary concerning General
Trumbull's statement in No. 344 of Tlic Open C<'«;V (article "Kos-
suth") of General Gorgei's "desertion." The word "desertion"
does not imply treachery, but suggests it. Gorgei surrendered to
the Russians because further resistance was absolutely hopeless,
and in the honest belief that better terms would be thus obtained,
not from a treacherous desertion of the Hungarian cause.
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